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Top International Monetary Fund (IMF) and U.S.
Treasury officials have put forth proposals designed to
make it eventually easier for governments and bond-
holders to go through a debt-workout process. Their
intent is to enable the G7 governments to scale back
their multi-billion-dollar bailout programs for countries
in financial difficulty on the theory that, if the road to
default was paved rather than bumpy, more of them
would choose to take it rather than seek large-scale
financial support. Experience strongly suggests, howev-
er, that the absence of better bankruptcy procedures has
not impeded several debt workouts; that in cases when
the bankruptcy option was available, it was nevertheless
avoided; and that even if the IMF and Treasury initia-
tives had been in place in 2001, the tragedy in
Argentina would not have been prevented. The best way
for the G7 and the IMF to extricate themselves from the
current morass is by curbing sharply the financial help
that they offer to countries in trouble.
A Critique of Sovereign
Bankruptcy Initiatives
THE IMF AND G7 SHOULD CURB FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES IN TROUBLE.
By Arturo C. Porzecanski
D
uring the past year-and-a-half, policymakers
in Washington and other G7 capitals have
been advocating that the functioning of the
world’s financial markets must be improved
by making it easier for insolvent govern-
ments, especially in the “emerging” markets, to obtain
debt relief from their bondholders. Two high officials
appointed in late 2001 have made this project their top
priority: Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing director of
the IMF, and John Taylor, Under Secretary for
International Affairs at the U.S. Treasury. In fact, the
IMF’s supervisory committee (the IMFC) has instructed
the Fund’s management to come up with a concrete plan
for a statutory mechanism to facilitate the bankruptcy of
nations by April 2003.
Official rationale and proposals
The IMF’s rationale for this plan was summarized in a
press release April 2002, issued after two days of
Executive Board discussions on sovereign debt restructur-
ing: “An important shortcoming in the international finan-
cial system is the absence of a framework for the pre-
dictable and orderly restructuring of sovereign debts. . . .
The upshot . . . is that debt restructuring is often delayed,
prolonged and disorderly, depleting asset values of credi-
tors and imposing severe hardship on the debtor country.
This is damaging not only to the debtor and its creditors,
but it is also disruptive to international capital markets
and to the trading partners of the debtor country.”1
According to a speech delivered by Krueger at the
time, encouraging the orderly and timely restructuring of
unsustainable sovereign debts would have several bene-
1www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/202/pn0238.htm (April 1, 2002).fits: help private investors distinguish between good and
bad risks, help countries with good policies attract capital
more cheaply, and help prevent countries with weak poli-
cies from building up excessive debts that might leave
them vulnerable to a major crisis.2 All in all, she said,
facilitating sovereign debt restructurings “would result in
a better allocation of global capital and make the interna-
tional financial system stronger, more efficient and more
stable.”
Treasury Under Secretary Taylor, for his part, argued
in a presentation given contemporaneously that: “A more
predictable sovereign debt restructuring process for coun-
tries that reach unsustainable debt positions would help
reduce . . . uncertainty. It would lead to better, more time-
ly decisions, reducing the likelihood of crises occurring
and mitigating crises that do occur.”3 But Taylor was
much more forthcoming about why the G7 governments
are so keen on lubricating the world’s financial system by
improving sovereign bankruptcy procedures: “Limiting
official sector support when countries reach unsustainable
debt situations is also a key element of our emerging mar-
kets strategy. . . . The uncertainty that currently exists
leads to pressures for large [official] support packages.
Reducing this uncertainty will reduce such pressures.” In
other words, by facilitating sovereign defaults on bonded
debt and negotiations on the postponement of interest
payments and the forgiveness of principal obligations, the
G7 and the IMF will no longer need to put together large
packages of official support for presumably insolvent 
governments.
Krueger’s earliest proposal (November 2001) called
for the amendment of relevant legislation in all countries
to permit qualified majorities of bondholders to restruc-
ture all new sovereign bond issues under the aegis of the
IMF. It contemplated that debtor governments could
appeal to the Fund for a temporary stay on debt-service
payments and that the IMF would play the role of a benign
bankruptcy judge, managing the process whereby a
restructuring proposal is negotiated that would be binding
on all bondholders. Since none of the abrogation of bond-
holder rights is envisioned under any current national
laws, particularly in the jurisdictions of choice to issuers
and investors (New York State and the UK), the proposal
would have required uniform amendments to all domestic
legislation. Whatever the inherent justification and merits
of this proposal, it was—to say the least—exceedingly
impractical.
Krueger’s latest proposal (April 2002) calls for anoth-
er statutory solution, this time achieved through a univer-
sal treaty obligation rather than via piecemeal amend-
ments to national laws. Said obligation could most easily
be established by amending the IMF’s founding charter
upon a favorable vote by those member nations account-
ing for eighty-five percent of total voting power—far fewer
than eighty-five percent of individual country members.
The vote would empower the Fund to play a role not
presently contemplated by national laws governing bond
issues. Ms. Krueger’s additional innovation is that now the
Fund would no longer be empowered to make decisions
limiting creditor rights. The sovereign debtor and a qual-
ified majority of its bondholders would make the essential
restructuring decisions instead. However, the Fund would
surely play at least the role of an expert witness, render-
ing an opinion on how much debt forgiveness from bond-
holders a country in trouble requires. This second propos-
al, requiring as it does approval by several parliaments
beyond those in the G7 countries (which account for 45.5
percent of the IMF’s voting power), is at least less imprac-
tical than the first one.
Taylor’s proposal (April 2002) eschews statutory solu-
tions in favor of a contractual, market-oriented approach.
He proposes building a consensus among emerging-mar-
ket issuers, final investors and financial intermediaries
that future bonds should have new collective-action
clauses in their contracts describing as precisely as pos-
sible what would occur when a sovereign obligor decides
it must obtain relief.4 The first of these is a majority-action
clause, permitting a sizeable majority of bondholders (say,
seventy-five percent of total) to agree to a restructuring of
terms and conditions—a restructuring that would be bind-
ing on the minority. The second would spell out the
process by which debtors and creditors come together
when a restructuring occurs—in particular, who would
represent bondholders. The third would be a clause
describing how governments are to initiate the restructur-
ing process, namely, how they may declare a cooling-off
period during which payments may be deferred without
threat of litigation. To encourage the incorporation of
these new clauses into new bond offerings, and possibly
spur swaps of old debt without the clauses for new issues
with them, Mr. Taylor proposed two ideas. “First, the offi-
cial sector could require that these clauses be used by any
country that has, or is seeking, an IMF program. Second,
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2www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.htm (April 1, 1001).
3www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm (April 2, 2002).
4Collective action clauses already exist in bonds issued under United
Kingdom law, but most (around 70%) of the outstanding bonds of
emerging-market sovereigns have been issued in other jurisdictions
(such as New York and Frankfurt) where such clauses are not cus-
tomary.the official sector could provide some financial enhance-
ment, such as slightly lower charges on IMF borrowing for
countries that include these clauses in their debt.” The
Executive Board of the IMF discussed these latter ideas
last June, but they did not gain the support of most gov-
ernment representatives.5
This past September, the G7 nations endorsed a dual-
track approach to facilitating the sovereign debt-restruc-
turing process, backing both the Krueger and Taylor ini-
tiatives, even though the former would clearly supercede
the latter. Outside G7 circles, however, attitudes toward
the sovereign bankruptcy initiatives are very different.
The Krueger approach has generally failed to find any pri-
vate-sector support, and it has little official support out-
side the G7 nations. For example, finance ministers rep-
resenting the Group of 24 leading developing countries
have recently stated that while remaining “open-minded”
about the incorporation of collective action clauses into
bond contracts, they are “skeptical” of proposals entailing
an amendment to the IMF’s charter.6 Indeed, the Taylor
proposal is widely viewed as the lesser of two evils among
sovereign issuers, financial intermediaries, and informed
investors.
The Institute of International Finance (IIF), a
Washington-based research and advocacy group that rep-
resents the world’s largest private financial institutions
(including the author’s employer), was the first to announce
that it favors an approach that involves the inclusion of col-
lective-action clauses into new bond contracts. However,
the approach would also feature a private-sector advisory
group to work with troubled debtors and the official com-
munity as well as a partnership between private financial
institutions and governments to limit disruptive creditor
litigation.7 The pursuit of such market-based approaches
was later endorsed by five other private-sector organiza-
tions: the Emerging Markets Creditors Association, EMTA
(an association of traders of emerging markets’ debt instru-
ments), the International Primary Markets Association, the
Securities Industry Association, and The Bond Market
Association.8 The U.S. Treasury and leading investment
bankers have been searching for at least one reputable
emerging-market sovereign willing to volunteer to issue a
benchmark bond with new collective-action clauses facili-
tating an eventual restructuring, but so far they have not
been successful. A test transaction would obviously be a
coup for the U.S. Treasury, considering that the G7 gov-
ernments have yet to find a volunteer for their four-year-old
initiative to prevent financial crises by granting a contin-
gent credit line to countries that want a “good housekeep-
ing seal” from the IMF.
Assessment
Many investors, financial intermediaries, and emerg-
ing-market government officials are at a loss to under-
stand why the G7 and the IMF believe they would be bet-
ter off if the supposedly bumpy road to sovereign bank-
ruptcy were to be paved over. Indeed, the proposition that
the world would be a safer place if mechanisms were to be
agreed upon and implemented that would enable govern-
ments to default has little intuitive appeal. Practical expe-
rience suggests that, despite the strong rights that bond-
holders have on paper under New York and UK law, the
enforcement of claims against sovereign governments is
exceedingly difficult. Whereas delinquent corporations
can be hauled, de jure and de facto, before a bankruptcy
court and be forced to change management, restructure
operations, dispose of assets, or even liquidate to pay off
claims, governments cannot be subjected to the same
treatment. The main disincentives against sovereigns
defaulting are the loss of reputation and of credit ratings,
the temporary isolation from the international capital mar-
kets, and the fallout from default in terms of domestic con-
fidence, local interest rates, and the exchange rate. Those
in the business of issuing, underwriting or investing in
sovereign bonds are generally of the view that, if anything,
international reforms should focus on making contracts
easier to enforce and on facilitating the constructive
involvement of bondholders in debt-restructuring negotia-
tions. Only Mr. Taylor’s frank admission that what the G7
really wants is to minimize the need to bail out countries
with multibillion-dollar packages, to be accomplished by
facilitating default as an option for cash-strapped govern-
ments, makes some sense—from a purely selfish G7 per-
spective, that is.
To begin with, the governments of Ecuador, Pakistan,
Russia, and the Ukraine have all been able to restructure
their bonded debt in recent years, without recourse to or
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attitudes toward the sovereign
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5www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn0277.htm (July 26, 2002).
6www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/2002/100702.pdf (October 7,
2002), p. 312.
7www.lif.com/data/public/icdc0402.pdf (April 9, 2002). 8www.emta.org/ndevelop/oneill.pdf (June 3, 2002).even in the absence of collective-action clauses—never
mind favorable legislation at the national or international
level. Substantial debt-service relief and even sizeable
debt forgiveness were obtained through the use of
exchange offers, sometimes accompanied by so-called
exit consents that encouraged the participation of as many
investors as possible in take-it-or-leave-it settlements. In
the case of Romania, the original cash flow and private-
sector involvement objectives were attained via the place-
ment of a new bond issue rather than a potentially trau-
matic restructuring of past obligations. Experience has
demonstrated that neither the threat of litigation nor actu-
al cases of litigation have obstructed these various emer-
gency financial operations. Although it is true that one
lone creditor was able to use the New York and Brussels
courts to collect payment from a formerly bankrupt gov-
ernment (Elliott Associates vs. Peru in 2000), the amount
involved was relatively small, the favorable judgments
took years to be obtained, the government would have
been likely to prevail upon appeal, and most importantly
the country’s debt restructuring under the Brady plan was
neither obstructed nor invalidated.
Beyond this experience from the recent past, it would
behoove the G7 governments to ponder whether the recent
tragedy in Argentina would have been avoided if either
the Krueger or Taylor approaches to sovereign bankrupt-
cy had been in place in 2001. It is possible that the G7
governments would have slammed the door on Argentina
earlier than in the final two months of that year: they
might have refused to put together a medium-size package
of financial support in late 2000 or might have refused to
augment it modestly in August 2001 if an elegant sover-
eign bankruptcy mechanism had been available. Yet, the
absence of a smooth debt-restructuring process did not
stop G7 officials from slamming the door on Russia in
mid-1998, despite potentially catastrophic worldwide
economic consequences. It did not stop the G7 from forc-
ing unwilling Ecuador (in 1999) into the first-ever default
on Brady bonds and the first-ever default on sovereign
Eurobonds issued in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. It did not stop the G7 governments from insisting that
Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Ukraine restructure their
obligations to bondholders or commercial banks (falling
due in 1999-2002) to obtain IMF financial support or debt
relief from official creditors via the so-called Paris Club.
Similarly, it is possible that the Argentine authorities
would have decided to declare a moratorium on debt pay-
ments much earlier than in December 2001 if they had
had greater certainty about the bankruptcy process. Yet,
the final outcome—an economic depression—would have
been exactly the same. Since a substantial proportion of
the Argentine government’s debt obligations were held by
local banks, pension funds, and insurance companies, any
announcement of a payments stand-still with the intention
to seek massive debt forgiveness would have triggered a
stampede of bank depositors and a collapse of the pension
and insurance industries. This would have led to a run on
the central bank’s official reserves, precipitating a devas-
tating currency devaluation and thus the same economic
implosion, political fallout and popular discontent that we
witnessed in 2002. The only difference is that it would all
have unfolded several months earlier, with no benefit
accruing to anyone—except the G7 and the IMF, which
would surely not have made the eleventh-hour disburse-
ment they made in September 2001. But then, they might
have been more generous with Argentina earlier on.
The Underlying Problem
The controversy about sovereign bankruptcy proce-
dures makes sense only as a G7 strategy to enable it and
the IMF to scale back support for governments in finan-
cial trouble. As the discussion that follows will show, it is
not necessary to have improved bankruptcy mechanisms
in place to reverse a policy approach that has outlived its
usefulness. What is needed is for the G7 nations to extri-
cate themselves from the big bailout business.
The multibillion-dollar G7 and IMF rescue packages
trace their conception to the final days of 1994. It was
then that the newly inaugurated Ernesto Zedillo adminis-
tration in Mexico found itself with insufficient reserves of
U.S. dollars to meet debt obligations maturing in the first
months of 1995. To avoid having to default and suffer the
economic and political consequences, President Zedillo
appealed to the White House for extraordinary financial
support. The Clinton administration obliged, digging
deeply into its own pockets and persuading other G7 gov-
ernments and the IMF to do the same. Interestingly, the
existence of a sovereign bankruptcy framework of the
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the Krueger or Taylor approaches
to sovereign bankruptcy had been
in place in 2001. Krueger or Taylor varieties would have made no differ-
ence to Mexico seven years ago. The debt obligations at
stake were not bonds issued under New York or UK law.
Instead, the equivalent of more than $25 billion in dollar-
indexed Mexican Treasury securities was subject only to
Mexican jurisdiction—the so-called Tesobonos. Nothing of
an international legal nature stopped the Zedillo adminis-
tration from negotiating a restructuring with its bondhold-
ers, submitting a law authorizing a postponement of pay-
ments to the then rubber-stamp Congress, or appealing for
relief to the pliant Mexican courts.
The success of the Mexican bailout of 1995, in the
sense that Mexico was on the mend and able to pay back
the U.S. Treasury and other official creditors within a cou-
ple of years, encouraged the U.S. government to spear-
head a series of other bailouts in Asia and Russia during
the financial crises of 1997 and early 1998. The Robert
Rubin-Larry Summers Treasury team essentially adopted
the Colin Powell military doctrine of the early 1990s:
intervene, if you must, but with overwhelming force. They
stitched together several bailouts, measured in the tens of
billions of dollars, that were intended to forestall damag-
ing defaults by convincing domestic and foreign creditors
that Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Russia had
the necessary financial wherewithal. Here, too, the
absence of a sovereign bankruptcy framework of the
Krueger or Taylor varieties made no visible difference.
When the G7 governments realized in December 1997
that the aid they were pouring into South Korea was leak-
ing out in the form of debt repayments to foreign commer-
cial banks, they did not hesitate to pressure the newly
inaugurated Kim Dae Jung administration to restructure
obligations to the banks. Likewise in Russia several
months later: the burning issue was whether to default on
domestic Treasury instruments (the so-called GKOs and
OFZs) that were unprotected, like Mexico’s Tesobonos, by
international law. In the wake of a G7 cut-off of financial
assistance to Moscow, of course, the Boris Yeltsin admin-
istration ended up defaulting on them, much like
President Zedillo would have done two-and-a-half years
earlier, but for G7 support.
The magnitude of the G7’s departure from previous
practice since 1994 is illustrated by the extent to which
the IMF’s guidelines for financial assistance have been
stretched in recent years. The Fund’s original charter,
drawn up in 1944, authorized member countries to borrow
as much as one hundred percent of their quota, namely, no
more than the amount of their initial subscription into the
IMF, which varied according to a country’s size and other
factors. This ceiling was subject to exceptions “especially
in the case of members with a record of avoiding large or
continuous use of the Fund’s resources.”  However, as
trade flows expanded rapidly during the 1950s and 1960s
and quotas were not raised, the exceptions became
increasingly common; and programs were often in the
range of 100-200 percent of quota.
During the difficult 1970s and early 1980s, cumula-
tive access limits were repeatedly raised to a peak of 600
percent of quota—in response to two world oil crises, two
global recessions, and the onset of Latin America’s debt
crisis. When the international financial emergencies sub-
sided and the size of member contributions was increased
during the 1980s and 1990s to reflect the expansion of
world trade, however, cumulative access ceilings were
reduced to a maximum of 300 percent of quota. This is the
limit that has prevailed since 1992, although again with
exceptions allowed for extraordinary circumstances. Yet,
the consensus view developed in the 1980s and early
1990s was that disbursements by the IMF could not pos-
sibly suffice to plug most of the holes of a leaking sover-
eign ship of state. The Fund was to play a catalyst role,
providing seed money for a turnaround and encouraging
the financial markets to regain confidence and provide the
bulk of whatever funding was necessary.
It is against this background that the aid provided by
the IMF in recent years must be measured. Table 1 shows
the extraordinary levels of funding provided by IMF since
1995. Moreover, additional sums were provided by the
treasuries of the G7 governments bilaterally, via the Bank
for International Settlements, and by the World Bank and
the respective regional developments banks, until all of
the aid packages could be measured in the tens of billions
of dollars. 
It is likely that what we call the Powell doctrine as
applied to international finance has created as many prob-
lems as it has solved. The possibility that a country may
or may not get a huge package of financial support with
which to meet its debt obligations has become one of the
key elements in the assessment of sovereign creditworthi-
ness. Many credit ratings, analyst recommendations, and
investment decisions hang on the understanding that this
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stretched in recent years.or that foreign government is viewed with favor by the
White House, Downing Street, and beyond. This suggests
that some countries will be rescued on strategic grounds,
despite the cause of their woes, the merits of their reaction
plan, or the availability of legal recourse. This is akin to
having to pick stocks or bonds for a portfolio not on the
basis of whether a weak company will manage to turn
itself around but, rather, on whether it will be nursed back
to health via a possible infusion of large-scale government
support. How could the U.S. financial markets possibly
function well if deus ex machina rescues à la Chrysler
were to be commonplace? Yet this interference is what
issuers, investors, and intermediaries operating in the
emerging markets have had to contend with during the
past seven years.
The time has come to scale back the official financial
support made available to errant nations, and a decision
along these lines need not await improved sovereign bank-
ruptcy procedures. As a necessary first step, the G7 should
get the IMF out of the business of providing huge packages
of aid measured in many multiples of a country’s quota.
Although re-establishing as low a relative ceiling for aid as
prescribed by the IMF’s founders would emasculate the
Fund needlessly, the objective should be for access levels
to be consistent only with the provision of seed money for
economic and policy turnarounds on as objective a basis as
possible. It is patently unfair that some governments
should be lavished official aid, and others should be
starved, when the IMF is a co-operative to which its mem-
ber governments should be able to turn for fairly automat-
ic, albeit limited, help. Scaled-back official intervention
on behalf of countries in trouble will likely encourage gov-
ernments and their bondholders to consider much more
seriously the implications of falling into the abyss of bank-
ruptcy—regardless of whether or not either of the current
G7 initiatives ever yield some fruit.
Outlook
In sum, the U.S. Treasury has joined its G7 counter-
parts in giving top priority to finding ways of facilitating a
bankruptcy process for heavily indebted nations, includ-
ing via an expanded role for the IMF. It has done this even
though recent experience does not justify it: the absence
of said procedures has not impeded several landmark debt
workouts; in instances when the bankruptcy option was
available it has been avoided; and the existence of an
orderly process would not have prevented, for instance,
the debacle in Argentina. In our view, the Treasury’s and
IMF’s persistent advocacy on this issue has started to
alienate the already limited investor base for sovereign
bonds that are rated below investment grade, except in the
case of those countries deemed to be “protected” because
they are of strategic interest to the G7 (such as Colombia
and Turkey). Pushing a sovereign bankruptcy process may
also encourage reform fatigue and reduced fiscal disci-
pline in some of the weakest sovereign credits—including
Argentina—because of the allure of an eventual “fast
track” to debt forgiveness. Besides, if the real purpose
behind the initiatives is to extricate the G7 countries from
the big bailout business, the best way to accomplish this
is by reintroducing limits to the rescue packages that the
IMF is allowed to put together.
The less harmful of the options being pursued
involves the voluntary adoption of collective action claus-
es in bond covenants, which would facilitate a renegotia-
tion of terms and conditions should circumstances warrant
it. At present, most emerging-market issuers and investors
are loath to introduce such clauses for fear of signaling
that they contemplate or countenance an eventual
default—something akin to the chilling effect that talk of
a prenuptial agreement tends to have on a marriage. In
any case, even if such clauses were to be introduced vol-
untarily in new issues, the stock of outstanding bonds
would still be governed by preexisting legal covenants,
such that their practical effect would be absolutely mar-
ginal for many years to come.
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TOTAL ACCESS TO IMF FUNDS UNDER SOME








Argentina Jan 2001 500
Turkey 2001 1,560




1The cumulative access limit prevailing during this time period was 300 percent of quota.
2Result of new credit facility replacing a previous one, and considering new amount made
available (SDR 12.8 billion) plus disbursements already made under prior arrangement
(SDR 11.7 billion).
3Result of new credit facility replacing a previous one, and considering new amount made
available (SDR 2.13 billion) plus disbursements already made under prior arrangement
(SDR 150 million).
4Result of new credit facility replacing a previous one, and considering new amount made
available (SDR 22.8 billion) plus disbursements already made under prior arrangement
(SDR 11.4 billion).
Source: IMF, ABN AMRO
TABLE 1The more harmful option entails amending the IMF’s
charter allowing it to override national legislation, thus
establishing a supranational bankruptcy procedure. This
attempt to amend the IMF’s charter will take several years
to take effect, if at all, because it must be approved by the
national parliaments of many countries. ■
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